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Abstract. Rational cryptography is an emerging eld which combines
aspects traditionally related to security with concepts described in eco-
nomic theoretical frameworks. For example, it applies game theory con-
cepts to address security problems arising when executing cryptographic
protocols. The aim is to replace the assumption of a worst{case attacker
by the notion of rational agents that try to maximize their payos. In this
work, we dene a formal framework and a meta{heuristic technique for
the automated synthesis of multi{party rational exchange security (M{
RES) protocols. We provide experimental results for a simple scenario
where a 3{party rational exchange protocol is automatically designed.
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
1 Introduction and Motivation
The exchange problem of how to design a general procedure according to which
several parties can exchange items in a fair manner has attracted much attention
throughout the years. Interest in this class of protocols stems from its importance
in many applications where disputes among parties can occur, such as digital
contract signing, certied e{mail, exchange of digital goods and payments, etc.
Roughly, the property of fairness means that no party should reach the end of the
protocol in a disadvantageous position. Still, there exist no protocol according
to which a number of parties can exchange items in a fair manner exclusively by
themselves, assuming that misbehaving parties take part in the protocol ([1].)
As a result, all fair exchange protocols require a trusted third party (TTP) in
order to preserve fairness during the exchange.
By contrast, rational exchange protocols do have the enormous advantage
of not needing a TTP. Informally, a rational exchange protocol cannot provide
fairness, but it ensures that rational (i.e. self{interested) parties would have no
reason to deviate from the protocol, as misbehaving does not result benecial.
The work presented in this paper focuses on the automated design of this type
of protocol (rational exchange protocols) in multi{party environments.
Next we motivate the need for this approach and introduce some related
work.
Shortage of rational proposals. As it is only recently that rational ex-
change schemes have been considered as an alternative solution to the exchange
problem, there are very few rational exchange protocols proposed in the litera-
ture (see e.g. [2], [3].)
Automated analytical tools versus automated designing tools.With
regard to the formal analysis of security protocols, several automated tools have
been presented over the years (see [4] for an excellent survey.) In every case the
focus has always been on the validation of existing schemes. We intend to adopt
a relatively novel approach integrating formal verication within the designing
methodology.
Meta{heuristic search for automated protocol synthesis. It is clear
that the number of possible protocols achieving a set of goals from a set of
initial assumptions grows exponentially as the number of goals or the number
of participant entities rise. In this context, a designing methodology based on
meta{heuristic search appears to be a reasonable option. Hao, Clark and Jacob
were the rst in applying these techniques for the synthesis of protocols that are
provable correct and satisfy certain security criteria ([5] and [6].) In their work,
they present an automated tool, based on Simulated Annealing, which nds
security protocols that achieve certain goals from a set of initial assumptions. In
later work [7] the authors apply a dierent heuristic technique based on genetic
algorithms for the synthesis of provably secure protocols. A similar approach is
also adopted by Park et al. in [8] to the synthesis of cryptographic protocols for
a fault{tolerant agent replication system.
1.1 Overview of Our Work
In this paper, we describe a framework for the automated synthesis of rational
exchange protocols (Section 2). The practical implementation of this formalism
results on an application designed to nd multi{party rational exchange security
(M{RES) protocols for specied scenarios. We will illustrate its practical appli-
cation within a 3{party scenario (Section 3) where our heuristic technique nds
rational solutions very eciently.
2 Foundations
Simple linear structures such as vectors and matrices will be used to represent
all aspects of a multi{party exchange problem. Prior to describing the model in
detail, the following denition will serve to unify notation throughout the paper:
Denition 1 (Exchange protocol). Given a set of entities P = fP1; : : : ; Pvg
and a set of items O = fo1; : : : ; omg, an exchange protocol  consists of n steps,
each denoted by (t) Pi ! Pj : ot1 ; : : : ; otkt , where:
 t = 1; : : : ; n is the step number,
 Pi, Pj 2 P , i 6= j, are the sender and receiver of the message, respectively.
 fot1 ; : : : ; otktg  O are the items Pi sends to Pj, subject to Pi owning those
items at step t of the protocol.
Note that this denition merely describes a series of messages being ex-
changed between participants so that, at the end of the protocol execution some
entities would have lost control over some of their items as well as having gained
access over new ones. Further along in the synthesis process, a tness function
will decide how good a protocol is in giving solution to a specic exchange prob-
lem.
2.1 Protocol Representation
Protocols described in Denition 1 will be represented by a series of matrices.
Protocol Matrix. A protocol  is represented by a matrix S 2Mn(m+2) =
[si;j ] of integers, where each row is interpreted as a message in which the rst
two components identify the sender and the receiver of the message, respectively,
and the rest of the row components represent the items being sent.
Although matrix S represents the series of steps that participant entities
have to take along a protocol execution, the actual real message content being
sent at each step is subject to: (1) the sender entity holding the referred items
at that point in the protocol run; and (2) those items being accessible to that
sender. Dierent situations could derive in a non{accessible status of an item oj
for a particular entity Pi. For example, if an item oj is encrypted and entity Pi
does not hold the decryption key. Something similar happens if entity Pi is able
to generate item oj but it needs to gain access to other items in order to do so. In
this case, item oj must remain non{accessible until gaining control over the rest
of the required tokens. During the protocol execution this kind of information,
which is specic to the particular exchange problem at hand, will be captured
in two additional matrices: a matrix H(t) denoted state matrix and a matrix R,
denoted inter{dependency matrix describing items' dependency relations. Both
structures are described below.
State Matrix. For each step t in the protocol t = 1; : : : ; n, matrix H(t) =
[hi;j(t)] 2Mvm will capture the possessions of each party at the end of such a
step. At the initial step (t = 0) the matrix will represent the possessions of each
dierent entity prior to the exchange.
Inter-dependency Matrix. A matrix R = [ri;j ] 2M(vm)(vm) will capture
the inter{dependency relations for each hi;j 2 H for a given exchange problem.
Two dierent types of dependency relations, positive and negative, can be ex-
pressed within the model as follows:
{ Items oi and oj are positively related if when oj is non{accessible then,
gaining access to oi implies gaining access to item oj too.
{ Items oi and oj are negatively related if when oj is non{accessible, then
receiving oi implies making item oi non{accessible.
Further and more complex dependency links may be represented in matrix
R, involving several items. The only restriction imposed by this representation
is that negative and positive relations between any two given elements cannot
be simultaneously expressed.
Updating the State Matrix. Initially, a candidate solution consists of a pro-
tocol matrix S , a state matrix H(0), and an inter{dependency relation matrix
R, specic to the exchange environment. As the protocol execution progresses,
the state matrix H is updated according to the instructions given in the protocol
and the positive and negative restrictions imposed by matrix R. At the end of
the protocol execution H(n) will reect the possessions that each entity holds
and also those items that each entity has lost control over. How good the pro-
tocol S is in giving solution to a particular exchange problem will be decided
by a tness function.
2.2 Fitness Function
A tness function is individually dened for each participant of the protocol to
evaluate the gains obtained at each step of the scheme. The search will aim at
nding exchanging schemes which maximize each individual tness function.
Benet Matrix. In our model, all participants assign every item involved in the
exchange a particular value. Those values serve to represent each individual's set
of requirements and are captured in matrix B = [bi;j ] 2Mvm, denoted benet
matrix. A more formal description of this matrix is given next:
bi;j =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
1 i Pi incurs cost when losing control over oj
0 i item oj is of no value to participant Pi
 1 i Pi obtains benet when losing control over oj
(Via coalitions or incentives)
> 1 i item oj is required by participant Pi
(It represents the value that item oj is worth to entity Pi,
if and only if, oj becomes accessible to Pi)
(1)
Maximum and Minimum Benet Values. The following criteria will serve
to: (1) compute the maximum benet that an entity can obtain in a single
protocol run; and (2) compute the minimum benet that each entity Pi will
obtain, which satises its requirements.
{ A maximum benet value b^i represents the payo obtained when the out-
come of the protocol run is the most favorable for entity Pi. It is computed
considering that the entity has gained access to all the required items, it
has sent all items for which losing control over is benecial and has kept all
items for which sending represents a cost.
{ Minimum benet value bi represents the minimum payo that entity Pi
would expect to obtain with the exchange. The minimum that a rational
entity will consider as a satisfactory exchange is that in which the entity has
gained access to all required items, has had to lose control over items for
which sending represents a cost, and it does not possess any of the items for
which relaying is benecial.
We will now dene a tness function to compute participant \tness" (i.e.
benet attained) after each step in the protocol, as well as global protocol tness
at the end of a protocol run.
Utilities. At each step t of the protocol (after updating state matrix H(t)
according to the transference of items), we shall refer to the gains achieved by a
player so far as \utility" or \payo" values. Each Pi's current utility at step t,
(0  t  n) can be denoted as ui(t).
Dierential Utilities. The dierential utility dui for a player Pi between steps
t1 and t2, with 0  t1  t2  n, is dened as:
dui(t1; t2) = ui(t2)  ui(t1) (2)
Additionally, a global dierential utility dU will measure the overall tness of a
protocol solution S . This can be dened as the sum of the benet attained by
each participant at the end of the execution:
dU(S) =
vX
i=1
dui(0; n) (3)
2.3 On the Solution Space
Given the formalism just described, our goal will be to explore the space of all
exchange protocols to nd schemes which are:
1. Feasible: That is, the exchange described by the protocol solution S would
represent a feasible transference of the required items between each protocol
participant and,
2. Rational: During a protocol execution, there may be steps at which players
run into a temporarily \worse" state (i.e. dui(t; t + 1)  0.) However, the
relevant factors which ensure rationality of the scheme are:
i. At the end of the protocol run, Pi must have gained enough dierential
utility. If dui(0; n) > 0, the exchange is protable to Pi, if dui(0; n) < 0,
the exchange is non{protable to Pi and, when dui(0; n) = 0 indicates
that the exchange is of no use to Pi.
ii. For each participant, the utility ui(n) must satisfy the minimum required
by Pi (ui(n)  bi).
iii. Finally, entities having attained their required minimum bi in an inter-
mediate step, should not be considered as active participants for the rest
of the protocol. That is, entities achieving their goals must be forced to
quit the protocol execution.
How Many Exchange Protocols Exist? As described in Section 2.1, a pro-
tocol is represented by a matrix S 2 Mn(m+2). An estimate of the total
number of possible exchange protocols can then be given by:
O  v!
(v   2)!2
nm

= O v(v   1)2nm = O(v22nm) (4)
where n is the number of protocol steps, v is the number of entities and m is
the number of tokens involved in the exchange.
It is dicult to determine how many of these protocols represent feasible
solutions to a specic exchange problem. Even more challenging is to estimate
how many of those feasible solutions represent a rational exchange. An heuristic
search based on Simulated Annealing will assist in nding those protocol designs
within the solution space of a given multi{party exchange problem, which satisfy
the above conditions of feasibility and rationality.
3 Automated Synthesis of a 3{RES Protocol
For the purpose of this paper, we will focus on a particular 3{entity exchange
problem. For every participant entity we will provide a series of initial assump-
tions and goals which will be represented using the matrices described in Section
2.
3.1 A 3{RES Problem
Initial assumptions and other aspects of the particular exchanging problem are
formalized as follows:
1. The specic exchange problem will consist of an entity P0 which aims to
collect a series of electronic items from entities P1 and P2, delivering the
appropriate tokens in return. All entities, P0, P1 and P2, are considered
to be rational (aimed to maximize their payos). The following items are
involved in the scheme:
 o0: Request token issued by P0 containing a description of the item that
P0 requires from P1.
 o1: Request token issued by P0 containing a description of the item that
P0 requires from P2.
 o2: Return token issued by P0 for P1 in return for o4.
 o3: Return token issued by P0 for P2 in return for o5.
 o4: Customized item issued by entity P1 as specied by P0 in o0.
 o5: Customized item issued by entity P2 as specied by P0 in o1.
2. None of the collected items in isolation is of any value to entity P0. In other
words, P0 is interested in collecting all (i.e. o4 and o5) or none of these items.
3. Entities must choose an arbitrary positive integer greater than one, for each
one of their required items. These values will represent the payo associated
to gaining access to such items.
4. Finally, the nature of these items is such that their utilities only become
available when the corresponding tokens are delivered in return. Although
this restriction seems hard, there are a few real life examples where items
are of this nature. For example, P0 could be a user trying to book a holiday
package consisting of accommodation, ights and tickets for a local tourist
attraction. User P0 needs either all or none of the required items and, ad-
ditionally, no item becomes available unless the providers of the required
services have received payment.
3.2 Search Technique and Parameterization
Simulated Annealing (SA) [9] will be used as search technique. The basic algo-
rithm has been slightly modied to stop when the rst rational exchange pro-
tocol which satises the requirements is found. (This can be done by previously
computing the minimum required global tness.)
A simple random mutation mechanism is employed as move operator. Given
a candidate solution (specied by a protocol matrix S), a neighbor is obtained
by randomly modifying a percentage of its elements. We will refer to the amount
of elements mutated in the matrix as the moving rate. The dierent moving rates
considered in the experimental work are: 1%, 5%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%,
60%, 70% and 80%.
The acceptance criterion in SA is given by:
s0 is accepted if f(s0)  f(s) > Ti lnu (5)
where s and s0 are, respectively, the current and mutated solutions, Ti is the
current temperature, and u is a random number uniformly generated in [0; 1].
At each cycle, the temperature is geometrically decreased by:
Ti+1 = Ti (6)
0 <  < 1 being the cooling factor.
Note that, after m cycles the temperature is Tm = 
mT0 where T0 is the
initial temperature. For Tm to be very close to 0 (say  = 10
 6) after m cycles,
a cooling rate of:
 =


T0
 1
m
(7)
is needed.
For our experimental work, these SA parameters have been adjusted accord-
ing to the denition of two dierent proles. Both, proles (I) and (II), will
satisfy the following property: in the rst cycle, the probability of accepting a
Hill Climbing SA (Prole I) SA (Prole II)
MR RS Avg. NPE RS Avg. NPE RS Avg. NPE
0.01 64.8% 108348 79.4% 82434 71.6% 90830
0.05 93.6% 47068 99.6% 27637 97.2% 29765
0.1 97.6% 36464 99.6% 24833 99.4% 23879
0.2 98.2% 35274 99.2% 32709 99% 29981
0.3 90.4% 59144 98.4% 47924 95% 50588
0.4 56.6% 42754 75.8% 67340 68.4% 55958
0.5 18.6% 26387 30.20% 56718 23.8% 44678
0.6 5% 14311 11.2% 40484 7% 29673
0.7 1.4% 11281 5% 37466 3.2% 24909
0.8 2% 10047 3.6% 34830 1% 24535
Random Search
RS Avg. NPE
2.0% 19823
6.4% 96975
12.4% 186519
23.0% 355611
(a) (b)
Table 1. Rate of success (RS) and average number of protocols evaluated (NPE) per
trial and moving rate (MR). Results estimated over 500 trials.
bad move which decreases the global tness value by just one unit will be ap-
proximately 0:5. Moreover, in prole (I), by half the total number of cycles, the
probability of accepting a bad move which decreases the global tness value by
more than one unit will be almost 0. So from exactly half the total number of
cycles onwards, the search will behave as a pure hill climbing (HC.) By contrast,
in prole (II), the probability of accepting a bad move which decreases the global
tness value by more than one unit will be almost 0 by one quarter of the total
number of cycles. In this case, from exactly one forth of the total number of
cycles onwards, the search will behave as a pure hill climbing.
Other parameters for our specic problem are the following. There are 3 par-
ties in the exchange which exchange 6 items according to the scenario described
in Section 3.1. The maximum allowed number of messages per protocol is set
to 10, with each message consisting of at most 6 items. Note that with these
parameters the search space (possible number of protocols) is O(263), according
to expression (4).
3.3 Results
Extensive experimentation has demonstrated that around 200 cycles with 1000
moves in the SA inner loop are sucient to reach solutions in reasonable time
(around 1 or 2 minutes.)
Table 1(a) shows the results obtained for the two SA proles and dierent
moving rates (column MR). The rate of success (column RS) represents the
percentage of executions attaining a feasible rational protocol over 500 trials.
The average number of protocols evaluated is indicated in column Avg. NPE.
Finally, both SA proles (I and II) are compared with the results obtained when
applying a classic Hill Climbing algorithm (HC.)
P0
o0;o1 // P1
o1;o4

P0
o2;o3 // P1
o3

P2
o4;o5
``AAAAAAAA
P2
(1) P0 ! P1 : fo0; o1gKP1
(2) P1 ! P2 : ffo1; o4gK 1
P1
gKP2
(3) P2 ! P0 : fo4; o5gK 1
P2
(4) P0 ! P1 : fo2; o3gKP1
(5) P1 ! P2 : ffo3gK 1
P1
gKP2
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. A synthesized 3{entity rational exchange protocol. The protocol runs in the
two phases illustrated on the right.
In both SA proles, the best results are obtained with a moving rate of
0:1, which results in around a 99:5% of success (i.e. almost every execution
produces a valid solution) by evaluating approximately 24500 protocols. These
numbers imply synthesizing a protocol for this scenario in less than 1 minute in
a common laptop. The success rate for slightly lower or higher mutation rates
are similar, though the number of total candidates evaluated before reaching
a solution grows considerably, thus resulting in a more inecient search. As
expected, higher mutation rates transforms the search in an almost random
procedure with fewer chances to succeed. Further comparatives are shown in
Table 1(b) where a random search is applied to resolve the same problem.
All in all, the best rates of success are systematically achieved by SA. Even
though a simple HC technique attains very good solutions too, the average num-
ber of protocols evaluated per trial serves as an experimental proof of eciency
in favor of a more sophisticated heuristic based on SA. Furthermore, our prelim-
inary experimentation indicates that this is certainly the case in more complex
exchange scenarios. Finally, as for a pure random search, the numbers are sev-
eral orders of magnitude below the results obtained by any of the other two
techniques.
3.4 An Example of 3{RES Protocol
Figure 1(a) shows an example of a synthesized protocol for the problem described
in Section 3.1. Further security renements are applied to each message resulting
in the scheme shown in Figure 1(b) (KPi and K
 1
Pi
denote Pi's public and private
keys, respectively.)
The 3{RES protocol synthesized using our proposed approach can be for-
mally proven rational using techniques based on game theory and backward
induction (see [10].) Informally, here are some aspects of the formalism which
ensure that the scheme is a feasible rational solution satisfying all participants'
sets of requirements:
 From entity's P0 point of view. As stated in the initial assumptions,
items o4 and o5 are of no use to entity P0 until the corresponding return
items o2 and o3 have reached entities P1 and P2, respectively. To this regard,
and since entity P0 requires either all or none of these items, entity P0 is
rationally forced to perform step (4) of the protocol.
 From entities P1 and P2 point of view. Again, the assumption of P0
requiring either all or none of the items forces (rationally) entity P1 to send
messages (2) and (5) and entity P2 to send message (3).
Therefore, no entity would unilaterally deviate from the 3{RES protocol as
they could not obtain better utility values in doing so. The scheme is then a
rational solution.
4 Conclusions
Traditionally, automated tools have always been applied to the analysis and
verication of existing security protocols. In this paper we have adopted a new
approach, ensuring rationality as part of the automated design of an exchange
scheme.
For the purposes of this work, we have designed and implemented a 3{RES
search algorithm based on Simulated Annealing. Moreover, the formal founda-
tions of our methodology ensure high levels of exibility and scalability for any
multi{party rational exchange problem.
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